Environmental Technology Transfer in a FDI Regime A Developing Country Perspective by Author One et al.
 
 
Environmental Technology Diffusion in a FDI Regime 




University of Mumbai 







Paper prepared for the presentation at the CSI Conference 2002; International Institutions and Multinational Enterprises: 
Global Markets, Global Players; at the University of Innsbruck; Innsbruck, Austria during 20-22 November, 2002.  
 
 
This paper is an offshoot of the research project ￿The determinants of FDI in India: Policy Analysis in a Regional 
Perspective￿ being investigated by the author under the auspicious guidance of Dr. D M Nachane, Department of 
Economics, University of Mumbai. The author is indebted to the anonymous review committee of the abovementioned 
conference for their helpful suggestions. The author is, however, solemnly responsible for any inconsistency and mistake 




This revised version is drafted on: 11
th November, 2002 
 
Keywords: FDI, Environment, Technology Diffusion, MEAs, WTO, India 




Economic and Political Weekly 
Hitkari House 
284, Shahid bhagatsingh Road, 
Mumbai- 400 001 
India 






The environmental impact of Foreign Direct Investment is still to be explored totally. It is often argued that 
investment may come to a region or country where environment protection norms are less strict.  Investors 
may be induced to outsource their pollution-intensive production where the expected cost of pollution 
abatement is significantly less. This gave birth to the much debated idea of ’pollution havens’, parallel to low-
wage havens. Developing countries are more vulnerable to such cases since the environmental legislation 
and monitoring is not rigorous over there. Again, many have debated that such ’pollution havens’ does not 
typically exist or at the best, transient in nature. 
 
Over the last decade, as a result of its policy towards opening up of the economy to the global markets, the 
extent of multinational activities and their share in trade and industrial production have risen steadily in India. 
Viewing this development, this paper primarily attempt to show the very existence of such a pollution haven 
in Indian scenario, analysing time series data for industrial production and international trade of identified 
pollution intensive industries in the country. Then it argues that, even if of transient nature, the phasing out of 
such a pollution haven regime is typically dependent upon the active institutional intervention. One important 
factor, this paper identifies, is of making of state-of-the-art knowledge base of impact analysis and alternative 
production possibilities that help design prudent environmental policy regime. Also it searches for the right 
kind of institutional interface at the international, national and industry level; and endeavours to find the 
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Introduction  
In a December midnight in 1984, forty tons of highly toxic Methyl IsoCyanate (MIC) gas; which had 
been manufactured and stored in Union Carbide￿s chemical plant in Bhopal, a state capital in India; 
escaped into atmosphere and was wind borne directly to the City habitat. The estimate of death toll 
numbered around 8000 with an over 200,000 people injured due to the inhaling of the toxic. Along 
with the enormity of human tragedy, what is more agonising is that after 18 years or so passed, the 
government have neither been able to pay compensations to all of the victims, nor it could punish 
the responsible Union Carbide authority thus providing justice to the suffered humanity. This case, 
being the most vivid example of industrial toxic accident, points us to the gross incapacity of the 
industrial environmental law and policing in the country. It reflects that even after such a sheer 
tragedy, the responsible can escape only after paying a statutory compensation to the victims. 
 
I ￿ The Case 
Though the above is only an extreme example, what we understand from that is that environmental 
or pollution preventing norms are grossly inadequate in the country; especially when compared 
with the same of the developed nations. So there are reasons to believe that, the manufacturers, 
who search for a ￿safer￿ location for their pollution intensive production activities, would take 
interest in countries like India. In fact, a country with lax environmental norms and weak monitoring 
would emerge out as the natural choice for such manufacturers, where the expected abatement 
costs are sufficiently less.  
 
Environmental Legislation in India 
India, in terms of its environmental legislation, lags behind all the advanced nations in almost each 
of the aspects. To mention, in the developed world, the cry for environment started in the decade 
of sixties last century, if not before; and most of the developed nations come out with their 
environmental/ pollution abatement legislations by then. That is why the 1960s are sometimes 
correctly referred as the ￿decade of environmentalism￿. India has, however missed the bus of the 
said environmental era and people have to wait until Seventies to have an environmental act. The 
first of its kind in India was the Wildlife Act, came into existence in 1972. Easy to understand, it has 
hardly any applicability to industrial pollution. The Water (Pollution and Prevention) act came in 
1974, which can be marked as the true beginning point of environmental legislation in the country. 
The Air (Pollution and Prevention) act and the Environment (Protection) act, both came in 1981.
1 
But for a comprehensive industrial pollution preventing legislative mechanism in India, people have 
to wait until 1994; when the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF), Government of India (GoI) 
issued a circular for mandatory environment clearance certificate for industrial projects. 
2 By that   4
time, India has already set its path for a new economic era and rapid industrialisation under state 
encouragement.  
 
The New Economic Policy in India 
The 1990s was a phenomenal decade for India in terms of its economic orientation and impacts 
thereof and change in the stance towards international economics. In 1991 July, a New Economic 
Policy (NEP￿91) was launched by GoI which had path breaking strategies. It encouraged a private 
enterprenurship-lead development path with a more open approach to the international economics. 
The economy changed its stance to an export oriented approach from a hitherto protectionist 
strategy. It opened many sectors for the private foreign enterprenurship which earlier were 
captivated to state activities only. The coverage is still increasing with various pro-foreign 
investment policies being adopted time to time. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was assumed to 
be an important vehicle for economic development and many major pro FDI policies have also 
been taken. Over the last decade, the FDI came to play an important role with respect to providing 
India with sources of long-term capital, creation of job, technology transfer- which all could together 
put India on a higher path of growth.  
 
Flow of FDI to India 
For this favourable strategic stance of the govt.; and with the natural competitive advantages India 
poses, like the big market, cheap labour and so; an increasingly bigger flow of FDI started to come 
in India, amounting a close to US$ 4 Billion in 2001-2002 from a mere US$ 155 Millions in 1991 
(Table 2, Data Appendix) Not only that, the export performance of the manufacturing sector has 
been improved significantly, pointing to a very high affiliate production level. For all this, it has been 
acclaimed to be a great success story for the economy. However, there are also a number of 
questions raised from different quarters about the quality of the foreign investment and impact of 
this kind of industrialisation of the economy and its said integration with the global market. Among 
this, we would address here the question of the impact on environment of such a pattern of 





II ￿ The Evidence 
The environmental impact assessment of an industrial production pattern mainly asks for the study 
of sustainability of the case. That is to say, whether the current pattern is sustainable by the   5
economy and the environment even after the initial stimulant or the cause of inception is ceased to 
exist. In our case, we would examine that, the change in industrial production pattern in the 
economy due to strategic changes, if there is any, whether capable to continue; if the country, in 
terms of its environmental legislation becomes at par with the other economies. To be explicit, we 
would look into whether the lax environmental norms played as a determining factor to the 
locational decision of the investors. A positive answer would suggest that there has been some 
￿Pollution Haven￿ effect in reality. We define the term as a manufacturing location where the 
perceived cost of pollution abatement is less than the other locations. The perceived cost of 
abatement is a resultant perception of the investors about the coverage of the law and penalty 
thereof and institutional monitoring mechanism, discounted for the spread of getting caught. Thus 
the term ￿pollution haven￿ becomes somewhat similar to the concept of ￿low-wage haven￿, where 
the manufacturers can hire labour at a cheaper average wage even after discounting for the skill 
levels. 
 
In our analysis we will follow the methodology of determining the ￿dirty-industry￿ pattern. We will 
see whether the pollution intensive sectors are growing more rapidly than the others. For that we 
will study the growth of industrial production in the selected sectors, vis-￿-vis the overall industrial 
growth path. One may argue that the pollution intensive production may increase more than 
proportionately due the domestic demand factors also, for that matter the idea of pollution haven 
ceased to exist to a significant extent. To capture this, we will also study the export behaviour of 
such products over the time. A continuous increase in exports would suggest an outsourcing of 
pollution intensive activities in the country.  
 
Defining Dirty Industries 
To start with, we need a basis to define the ￿dirty￿ industries, i.e., the industries with high polluting 
effects. One conventional approach in the literature has been to identify pollution intensive sectors 
as those having high levels of abatement expenditure per unit of output (Robison (1988), Mani 
(1996)). Another approach would be to identify sectors with high energy consumption coefficient 
per unit, since there is a direct positive link between energy production and pollution. But the 
lacunas in environmental knowledge-base in India prevent us to adopt any of the approaches 
aforesaid. In fact such a database is available only in a handful of developed countries like the US 
and some other OECD countries. This deficiency itself shows us the inadequacy of the monitoring 
mechanism in the country! Here we take a rather straightforward approach to select the pollution 
intensive industries- we take the set of seventeen industries identified by the MoEF, GoI as the 
most pollution intensive ones
3. The MoEF took a rather direct approach to identify this set by taking 
their actual emission (per unit). We take this set as the basis of our analysis.   6
 
Before that we would take a look on the nature of the stock of the FDI flow generated in India over 
the past decade (Table 1, Data Appendix), we recall that in 1994, in the comprehensive circular 
issued by the MoEF, GoI as a basis for environmental management of industrial activities, the 
authority has identified 29 industrial activities where a new project would require environmental 
clearance mandatory, prior to the establishment and commissioning the project. These activities 
said to have highest threat of environmental damage during their course of operation. A study 
(Veena Jha 1997) shows that around 80% of the approved FDI projects since 1991 falls in any of 
the above categories.  
 
Limitation of the Methodology and Overcoming 
Before proceeding any further, we must confess about the limitation of such a methodology for 
identifying a pollution haven effect. As it is generally understood, a locational decision about an 
investment project not only depends on a single point notion of (lax) environmental norms, rather it 
asks for many other locational variables like labour abundance, infrastructure, market size, natural 
resource abundance etc, as normally found in OLI models of investment decision (Dunning ). So 
considering only environmental norms as the parameter would, at best, give a partial view of the 
whole picture; until and unless we account for the other factors in the comparative advantage story 
by taking their relative prices scenario across the locations. This effect, however, could be 
minimised somewhat when we consider only the pollution intensive sectors; in a sense that the 
other effects are equal across all the industries and all the other industries have been equally 




We first analyse the production growth of the selected industries. Figure 1 shows the growth trend 
of the combined production of the selected 13 industries (in physical terms) for the period 1981-82 
to 1999-2000. It covers the initial years after the policy, and a decade before that, for the sake of 
comparison. It clearly shows an upward trend for all the industries, with a major shift in the rate of 
growth around the early 1990s in some of the industries, when India has opened up to world 
investment scenario. 
 
   7
Production of Selected Industries in Physical Terms











































One may argue that the shift in production of the said industries may be influenced by the domestic 
consumption demand itself. This is nevertheless may be true to some extent, but evidence also 
shows that domestic consumption of these goods have not been increased at that pace what the 
above figure may suggest; rather, export of such productions shows a spurt.  
 
Our next analysis deals with the export-import trend of such selected sectors. Here we take the 
ratio of value of export to that of import for the period 1981-82 to 1999-2000 (Figure 2) for them. 
Here also it covers the initial years after the policy, and a decade before that, for the ease of 
comparison. This trend also shows an upward rising path all through, gradually approaching unity.  
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Implication of the Results 
Our analysis have suggested two main results- one is the faster growth rate of the pollution 
intensive industries in the post policy period; and two, India has been exporting such pollution 
intensive products in a increasingly higher proportion of its import. With this we club two empirical 
facts, first is the concentration of FDI in those identified industrial activities (Table 1), and second is 
the rapid increase in the pollution abetment expenditure in the developing countries during this 
period. These altogether have the implication that there has been a shift in the favour of dirty 
sector production. This is either fueled by the increase in the affiliate production or through 
outsourcing, or both. Any of these suggests a possibility of existence of what we call a ￿pollution 
haven￿. In fact, we can find support of this result in the literature, to mention- Mani and Wheeler 
(1997). 
 
Empirical research also shows that there will be some countries that lag behind in their efforts to 
control pollution by now and may even take years to catch up with the rest of the world. They all 
possess a serious threat to have a pollution haven effect in reality. But at the same time, many 
have also argued that such a phenomenon is merely transient in nature and will be phased out in 
time, like the low wage havens. To them, environmental regulation increases continuously with 
income and seems to have played a role in the shift from dirty to cleaner sectors. Thus any 
tendency towards formation of a pollution have seems to have been self limiting. Dasgupta et al 
(1995) finds a very strong, monotonously increasing relationship between national income per 
capita and the strictness of environmental regulation. Economic growth brings countervailing 
pressure to bear on polluters through increased regulation, technical expertise and knowledge-
base, and citizen demand for clean environment. This way it makes the phase transient.   9
 
Motivation of the Paper 
But, this paper argues, that such a transition necessarily requires active intervention of the 
institution. In fact the motivation of the paper is to find out the mechanism of such a transition, and 
to identify the areas where it needs active institutional interventions to make the transition smooth 
and effective and thus to enable the society to reach the optimum. The problem has its typicality in 
the nature in a way that it attracts an externality effect; since the pollution affected society is not 
directly involved in the decision making. Thus it requires for a mediation of legislative institution 
and govt. execution. The next part of the paper deals with this mechanism of institutional 
intervention; taking the theoretical aspects at first, then endeavouring towards identification of 
thrust areas where the intermediating agency has got role to play. The last part of that paper deals 
with the practical problems of such a mechanism in a country like India, especially in a situation 




III The Analysis 
Over the globe the industry is growing its awareness to the need of environmental protection, since 
the issue of environment is being brought to the forefront of political and economic agenda. 
Environmental policies in virtually all the countries, with differential extents, are forcing industry to 
become more accountable for their actions through the adoption of ￿eco-friendly￿ production 
processes. For the industry, once only an ethical issue, now this is a necessary business practice. 
We aim, in this paper, how best such practices can be operational on the soil of a developing 
country like India, with necessary positive input from the state.  
 
Conceptual Issues 
From a theoretical perspective, the issue encompasses two different conceptual aspects- the 
technology diffusion by the firms and the environmental policy of the state. Therefore, we must at 
first understand the interaction of these two and, where and how they intersect. From an industrial 
organisation point of view, for the firm the state policy works out to be an external influence over 
the technology diffusion. Particular to the environmental policies are that they don￿t necessarily 
yield any direct gain to the firm for the adoption of any abatement technology, at best that reduces 
the perceived threat of non-compliance. So in theory, firms value the cost of such adoption against 
the expected penalty. Thinking mainly in this line, past studies have focused on the efficiency of 
particular policy instruments to make firms adopt abatement technology. The other breed of   10
research in the environmental policy was to measure the institutional feasibility of such an 
instrument. In both the cases, they look the firm￿s adoptability to such norms as given. Thus they 
more or less neglected the other dimension of the story, namely, the technology diffusion by the 
firms. More, the time frame over which the industry would stablise has rarely been addressed to. 
Here comes the dynamics of the technology diffusion that addresses the question of equilibrium in 
the industry.  
 
Technology Diffusion 
Literature on technology diffusion suggests that; one, policies are an important consideration 
because they advance the diffusion of technological innovations, which under normal 
circumstances may not occur even; and two, institutional control do influence the rate of 
technology adoption by firms (Brown, 1981). This paper, thus analyses various factors that 
contribute to the innovation and diffusion of technology. The particular case we attempt to is the 
diffusion of environmental technology, in a developing open economy, in response to pollution 
control legislation. The analysis would be suggestive in pointing out the factors which an economy 
should look into when considering policy formulation. At the same time we also confess that the 
literature is in deed thin with reference to empirical tests of significance of such factors (Ashford, 
1994) and few case studies are available.  
 
Environmental Policy 
For the case o pollution control, the primary objective universally worked out to reach some 
optimal, or, if not feasible, some desired standard of environmental quality. This standard can be 
achieved by motivating the polluting agents (the firms) to internalise ￿unaccounted for￿ costs of their 
actions. There are three widely recognised inducements for the firms: economic incentives, 
environmental regulation, and moral suasion (Hanley, Shogren and White, 1997; among others). In 
the first two methods we find a direct scope for institutional intervention. The basic idea of 
economic incentive tells that- producers profit comes from a market price which does not 
necessarily reflect society￿s preferences for the environmental quality. The producer has no 
economic motivation to supply the level of pollution control the society desires to. According to the 
economic incentive concept, the state is to raise the cost of environmental shirking while allowing 
the producer the flexibility to find the least cost pollution control technology itself. The increased 
cost of pollution would drive the firm towards the socially desired production/pollution level. 
 
The environmental regulation, or the standards approach, is a command mechanism used by the 
policy to achieve compliance with stated policy objectives. To make this work, the regulatory 
authority chooses any of the two approaches- a performance standard or a technology standard.   11
Under the former, the firm is free to choose whatever means it deems necessary to reach the 
designated level of environmental quality. This allows the firm the flexibility to choose the process 
that best suits its particular operation and cost structure. The costs of controlling are irrespective to 
the firms and under a performance standard each will use the most effective technology. Under a 
perfect competition in the input market and with perfect mutual knowledge, in the absence of 
product differentiation variables; all the firms are expected to use a uniform abatement technology. 
The technical standard approach involves the embodiment of a detailed technological specification 
of the controlling/production process. With a free and full flow of information in intra and inter-
industry level, this approach would lead to the most cost effective method adopted by everybody 
and the market would reach a stabilising equilibrium.  
 
To add, at the very beginning, due to the lack of knowledge about the abatement technology and 
initial set up cost, the regulating authority would go for a performance standard where the firms 
also comply rather easily with little or medium modifications to their existing production processes. 
This can be referred to as ￿incremental technology￿. But latter in the time with the innovation of 
sophisticated and integrated control technologies, the authority would opt for a technology 
standard resulting in homogeneity across industry.  
 
This view is also supported in the literature of technology diffusion. Incremental innovations will be 
adopted earliest due to their cost effectiveness and less disruptive influences to the existing 
production process. But the effectiveness of the adopted technology may differ between firms or 
even plants within the same firms but in different location or different management. Different plants 
may have differential abilities to deal with them; also the local conditions matter. At this juncture, 
the interaction between the firms and the institution becomes clearly visible, with the institution got 
role to play to influence the local condition.  
 
A Formal Analysis 
We may now move into a formal analysis of how technology diffusion takes place in response to a 
government policy.  Particularly, the analysis would shed light on a case of large MNCs present in 
a newly opened developing country with its obvious limitations regarding environmental norms. 
The above discussion suggest that mandatory environmental legislation catalyses the technology 
diffusion towards pollution control norms. More, the rate of diffusion is not only a function of 
innovation, but also of the firms and industry; particularly the flows of information between them. 
We can conceive a functional relationship between innovation and diffusion of environmental 
technology (TD) and government policy (Polg), with other factors like the information flow among 
the firms (Infoij), that of individual firms and linkage industries (InfoiL  ) and that of   12
government/institution and Industry as a whole; the localisation of the policy (Loc), the degree of 
coverage of policy and surveillance. The last factor has been adequately summed up into a 
perceived non-compliance cost (E (NC)), as described earlier, which takes the form of an 
expectation. Here we assume, taking cue from reality, that more often than not, the pollution 
abatement technology is supplied by some third party firms having expertise on that, rather 
innovating it by the firm of its own. The contribution of such outsourcing of abatement technology 
depends upon the free flow of information between the industry and technology supplying linkage 
firms. Though in a later stage, with research efforts of the firm, the option of internal development 
of abatement technology can be assumed. This typically depends upon the cost effectiveness of 
the alternatives. More, we describe here the equilibrium, or the stabilization in the industry after 
such policy enforcement comes when the abatement technology becomes uniform across the 
firms; and any new entrant finds it optimum to comply with the policy norm rather shirking, and also 
adopts the same technology. Assuming a free and full flow of information across firms and related 
industries and institution, formally we can write: 
 
 
TDi = Polg. F (Infoij, InfoiL, InfoGI, E (NC), Loc)               
V   i, j (individual firms)  
 
Where the govt. policy is a necessary condition to kick start the process. At the equilibrium, 
individual firm￿s abatement technology (for all) coincides with the technology standard fixed by the 
authority:  
TDi  = TDj= TDG 
 
Note on the contributing factors of technology diffusion: 
Studies suggested that there is a causal relationship between the particular policy instrument 
employed and the technological responses by the industry (Millman and Prince, 1989). However, 
we here trace out some basic ingredients in formulation of any policy to such effect. The primary 
two inputs we find out are the information base and communication, and the ￿local content￿ of the 
policy.  
 
Information and communication:  information or knowledge base plays a key role in formulation 
and effectiveness of any policy. In the cases of industrial pollution control policies, the scope of 
information base is much wider. It first requires a rigorous technical knowledge about the pollution, 
pollutant, polluters and the effected environment. Also it needs to know the state-of-the-art 
technology about control mechanism of such polluters. With the knowledge of economic benefit of   13
the activity, and the acceptable quality of environment to the ecology base, it can chalk out a policy 
framework. It must also check that the policy option should be technically and economically viable 
to the industry, to prevent it from a suboptimal level of functioning. One may correctly argue that 
this kind of information base and decision mechanism are rarely available in developing countries 
and so their environmental policies are roughly vague to a significant extent￿which can be, and 
being exploited by the large firms. Examples are many where some obsolete or abandoned 
technology has been tried shift to India (Veena Jha, 1997, Divan and Rosencranz 2001). With this 
we may add up the necessity of monitoring, which also requires systematic information and control 
mechanism; which are lacked by resources in developing countries. Though, parallelly, many 
political and public interest groups have emerged over the world in the field of environmental 
protection, many of them also have developed a good information base also. The authority may 
take into confidence their data source after correcting for obvious biases. 
 
Beyond the regulating authority, there are factors that influence the rate of diffusion. As identified 
earlier, these are the flow of information across the industry and across the linkage industry, along 
with the information exchange with the government. Since the linkage industries are the supplier of 
the control technology, the rate of technology diffusion will be governed by the multiplex interaction 
among the firms and the information network existing in the industry. Close communication 
networks and stronger producer-compliance-technology-supplier interaction would foster the rate 
of diffusion. Innovation is a cumulative process and achieved faster when inputs/information flows 
from both the sides. The process of learning is governed by the complexity of technology and 
existing/accumulating knowledge base of the technology users (Rosenberg 1976, 1982; Lundvall 
1988). The coupling of producers of compliance technology into the information net is thus 
becomes especially important in the technology diffusion dynamics. 
 
 
ii) Local Content of the Policy: if we see more deeply to the global pattern of industrial pollution 
protection these days, we find a process of decentralisation emerging out of the picture. The local 
authority in given increasingly more autonomy to combat the problem through effective fiscal 
measures. There are two distinct reasons behind this development. The first is that though having 
wider implications, most of the industrial pollutions are local and confined in nature that is, 
contained in one small geographic region; so the information about the pollution is much more 
available locally. The second is, due to the proximity, the surveillance becomes easier and 
accountability increases since both the industry and authority is placed in the vicinity of the affected 
citizen. So it has been much easier to prevent such problems with local level instruments- one 
interesting example of the case is the Ontario Environmental Protection Act (1971, 1980) and   14
Ontario Municipal Industrial Strategy or Abatement (1986) . More examples can be found at Forth 
Estuary, Scotland (Hanley and Moffat 1993). One interesting theoretical discourse can be found at 
(Saskin et al, 1983) One must note a point over here- different kind of control instrument have 
been used in different cases, according to the circumstances. The authority tried to use the best 
suitable instrument according to their perception. This increases the efficiency of the policy action. 
Being under a general environmental protection scheme at the central level, the local bodies 
empowered so and equipped with, can more effectively address the problem. Many of the 
developing countries like India, though having the all encompassing umbrella legislation about 
environmental protection, are more reluctant to work with the decentralised pattern of control- 
which is one of the possible sources of exploitation. These loopholes have been addressed by 
different public interest groups and NGOs (Veena Jha, 1997; Divan and Rosencranz, 2001). 
 
Another source of possible decentralisation is to identify one particular pollutant or polluting 
process and cultivate necessary legislation to control. Examples are found in Carbon Tax Act in the 
Netherlands (Bovenberg, 1993). It facilitates the formulation of the policy being point focused and 
also eases the monitoring. But this also requires specific and pointed information on all the aspects 
of the problem.  
 
 
However the story alters slightly with the entrance of multinational firms (MNCs) who often have 
other production facilities in different locations. It can be rightly argued that in some other location 
they have been made to use the compliance technology which must be along the line of newly 
introduced environmental norms in the region of question. In this case, the diffusion of technology 
and abatement know how becomes an intracorporate information exchange issue. Here the earlier 
compliance technology supplying linkage industry becomes passive. Though the possibility of 
linkage cannot be ruled out if the affiliate finds it cost- or otherwise- effective than to sourcing from 
the parent firm. However, when parent affiliate relation comes into action, the authority is to ensure 
that no obsolete/ abandoned technology is transferred, which is also forbidden by WTO. To one￿s 
wonder, the examples of such transfer are not unlikely, as in the case of  Du Pont plant in Goa, 
India  (Veena Jha, 1997) 
 
The rate of technology diffusion also depends upon the noncompliance cost. The liability rule 
should be set in a way that there is an incentive for the offender to follow the mandate rather than 
shirking or reducing the scale, or at its worst, closing the operation altogether. The incentive design 
must also ensure a speedy adoption of the compliance technology. In each of the aspects of the 
liability rule, that is, the coverage of the legislation in relation to the scope of activities of the   15
producers, the level of penalty and the policing mechanism, we understand easily that there is a 
scope for active institutional interface. 
 
 
Scope for Institutional Intervention 
Having Identified the factors affecting the diffusion of environmental technology across the 
industry, we may now go on to the exploration of the scope and possible role of institutions to 
foster he process. We are mainly interested in a case where the technology is owned by the MNEs 
and the concerned industry is located in a less developed economy. The case readily involves 
three parties; namely, the concerned economy, the MNE and the comprehensive sphere of the 
international institutions that effectively controls the affairs of environment, technology transfers 
and investments. These institutions are expected to have a positive approach towards the 
facilitation of dissemination of environmental technology.  
 
 
A survey of the International Agencies and their Agreements on Environmental Technology 
Transfer:  
To understand the existing international institutional mechanism in the context of environmental 
technology transfer, we better proceed in a dichotomised way, providing sufficient room for the 
interaction between two respective paradigms. They are, firstly, the issue of technology transfer in 
general, which forms the first part; and there are some special negotiations which address the 
issue of transfer of environmental technology in particular, which forms the second part. As clearly 
understood, the issue of technology transfer among economies is mainly governed by the WTO 
with its different chapters in operation. Under WTO, the Doha Ministerial Conference (November 
2001) was instrumental in defining the scope and role of WTO in terms of technology transfer. The 
agreements reached by the WTO members in Doha Ministerial Declaration has clearly ushered to 
examine the relationship between trade and transfer of technology and to work out possible 
recommendations that could be taken on the general mandate of the WTO to increase the flow of 
technology to developing countries (Paragraph 37). The Doha declaration mandates the Working 
Group on Trade and Investment (WGIT), formed at the Doha Ministerial itself, to clarify certain 
aspects related to a possible framework for the WTO in this context. It firstly stressed upon the 
common understanding of the definition of technology transfer, and also identified various channels 
through which advanced technology might disseminate among countries. In the context of 
technology, the overall objective of WTO towards the developing countries should be to help them 
in their efforts to integrate with the global economy with technology standardization. So an all-  16
encompassing definition of ￿technology￿ and its ￿transfer￿, which does not exclude relevant factors 
and hinders processes, is required. A broader definition would include the flow of technical know-
how, experience sharing and managerial skills as well, to understand effectively the dimensions of 
technology transfer. Next, the proper identification of channels for technology transfer will provide a 
common basis to asses the effectiveness of certain measures and provisions. Proper measures 
and provisions can only be made after realizing the nature of the problem of the channels 
themselves, problems of capacity constraints and absence of factors that help constitute 
favourable circumstances of technology transfer. FDI involves the dissemination of technology 
through the transfer of production factors, by the provision of services, through licensing 
agreements etc. Though there is no mechanical relationship between flow of FDI and transfer of 
technology, especially in the case of environmental technology, still one can find some factors that 
can influence such technology flow. A key element is the capacity of the developing countries to 
attract and absorb the appropriate environmental technology. In this context, considerations should 
be given to measures and provisions that encourage the creation of growth opportunities in the 
host country in terms of backward linkage development, capacity building etc. This issues and 
considerations were deemed necessary in the workings of the WGIT and needed to be properly 
addressed.  
 
Two other agreements under WTO is important in this context; those are, the Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and the Trade Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMs). The MNEs invest much of their proceeds into the R&D and so a newly developed 
technology/process is of significant value to them. That also gives them the coveted edge in the 
market competition. So naturally they would be rather shaky in terms of dissemination of such 
knowledge, especially in the regions where intellectual property rights are not precisely defined. 
This would hinder the process of technology diffusion towards the developing countries that often 
lack strict IPR norms. WTO has framed different datelines for the countries to formulate their IPR 
policies in order to smoothen out the conflicts on IPR and flow of technology to them. However, the 
developing countries rightly argued that there is a possibility of expropriating the biological and 
otherwise conventional wisdoms (genius loci) in the forms patenting (bio-piracy); and therefore the 
developing countries have asked the WTO to harmonize this with provisions of UN Convention of 
Biological Diversity.  
 
The TRIMs deal with policies that are considered inconsistent with GATT in the context of 
technology investment, and a time frame have been fixed here also to gradually eliminate such 
measures from the developing countries. Though the developing countries wanted to retain such 
measures which they deemed important to meet their development goals and ultimately the WTO   17
resolute to form a Working Group on Transfer of Technology to study the implications of 
agreements of WTO for technology transfers and ways for enhancing such transfers to developing 
countries. However, the issue of ￿domestic content measures￿, which the developing countries 
have been using as a measure of foreign investment control has a influencing role in ensuring 
linkages of FDI into the domestic economy and encouraging indigenization of FDI, has been a 
issue of many debates and needed to be sorted out effectively.  
 
WTO contributes towards the issue of environment in the context of technology transfer mainly 
through the chapter on Trade and Environment, raised during the ministerial at Marakesh (April 
1994). It comes out with some rather indirect approach towards the environmental technology 
transfer and encompasses the Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) outside the WTO to 
address the question of trade and environment. WTO addressed the issue through the Committee 
on Trade and Environment (CTE) with a two fold mandate; first, ￿to identify the relationship 
between trade measures and environmental measures in order to promote sustainable 
development￿, and second, ￿to make appropriate recommendations on whether any modification of 
the provisions of multilateral trading system are required, compatible to open, equitable and non-
discriminatory nature of the system￿. This broad base mandate covers goods, services and 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and builds on the progress already achieved in the previous 
GATT Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade. Discussions of the items under 
the CTE work programme have been grouped into two main areas: market access issues and the 
issues related to linkages between the multilateral environmental agenda and the multilateral trade 
agenda. The WTO Secretariat Report (October 1999) mentioned some direct references to the 
environmental technology transfer across borders and the involvement of multinational firms. It has 
suggested the possibility of such technological diffusion through MNEs.  
 
With this indirect involvement of WTO, different MEAs contribute towards the institutional capacity 
to control and mould the environmental technology transfer. The 2001 United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) conference on ￿Compliance, Environmental and Dispute Settlement in MEAs 
and WTO￿ elaborated on the jurisdiction and functinings of the MEAs to work under the WTO 
regime. It particularly addressed the potential conflict between international trade and 
environmental laws, also identified concrete synergies and overlaps relating to technology transfer. 
It thus has paved the way of building an institutional implementation-oriented cooperation among 
different MEAs, the WTO and the UNEP. 
 
Most of the existing Multilateral Agreements on Environment (MEAs) contain technology transfers 
as part of affirmative measures aimed at assisting the developing countries to meet their MEA   18
obligations. Examples of such MEAs that provide for technology transfer are the Basel Convention 
on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal, The Montreal 
Protocol on Substances That Deplete The Ozone Layer, The UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol. The Chapter 34 of Agenda 21 (Transfer of 
Environmentally-Sound Technology, Co-operation and Capacity Building),  of the UN Program of 
Action from Rio (1992), (hereafter only Agenda 21), has been the main guiding body of the MEAs 
on diffusion of environmental technology. It clearly defines what is meant by Environmentally 
Sound Technology (EST) transfers; the definition encompasses the know-how, procedures, goods 
and services and equipments, and the organisational and managerial procedures of the total 
system as well. This implies that an issue of such technology transfer should also address the 
human resource development and local capacity building aspects of technology choice to make the 
process sustainable. This indicates the desire to improve upon the terms and conditions under 
which developing countries can obtain ESTs from the private enterprises or the MNEs and access 
the publicly held technological knowledge related to better management of the environment.  
 
One important consideration for the developing countries in better management of environment is 
the issue of technological knowledge base. Due to resource constraints and poor history of 
systematic data collection, most of the developing countries suffer from a proper and effective 
information base on the industry and pollution, which hinders them from designing effective policy 
and to provide alternatives by the local government. Also it limits   the scope for bargaining in 
multilateral negotiations. This kind of effective information about pollution at global or local levels 
and knowledge about pollutants is mainly residing with developed country institutions. The 
multinational enterprises also have the technological knowledge of pollution preventing 
mechanisms and regularly enhancing them through research and development. The developing 
country institutions also lag behind in such R&D due to their heavily resource oriented nature. But 
the efficient designing of environmental policies are dependent upon the amount and quality of 
such available information and knowledge. So the issue of access of such knowledge by the 
developing countries has become crucial. The Agenda 21 attempts to provide the developing 
countries EST transfer terms which differ from those dictated by international technology markets. 
The measures it postulated in doing so includes: 
•  Removal of barriers to transfer privately owned ESTs and scientific knowledge 
•  Creation of favourable circumstances of such transfers with fiscal and other 
incentives 
•  Supplying of Patents and licenses to the developing countries on non commercial 
terms, as part of development cooperation for sustainable development 
•  Preventing abuse of IPRs   19
•  Provisions of financial resources to acquire ESTs by the developing countries  
•  Strengthening of institutional capacity for R&D and programme implementation; 
among others.  
 
It also addresses the issue of capacity building in the context of environmental management in the 
developing countries and provided guideline for assisting them through financial and other forms of 
capital. However, the source of such financing has always been a dispute. Agenda 21 also 
addresses the issue of use and abuse of IPRs in terms on environment and biodiversity. The issue 
has been raised in the WTO also by the developing countries and asks for specific provision for 
ensuring proper and logical use of IPRs. To summaries, Agenda 21 seeks for active participation of 
governments of the advanced countries and other national/international bodies to engage the 
private sector (the MNEs) who actually own ESTs and control their diffusion, and asks for sharing 




An initial survey of the other MEAs
4 shows that most of them have an explicit orientation of easing 
the process of technological disseminations to the developing countries. As UNFCCC (Article 4, 
1.c) says ￿Promote and co-operate in the development, application and diffusion, including 
transfer, of technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases￿ and in 5 ￿The developed country Parties and other developed 
Parties included in Annex II shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as 
appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to 
other Parties, particularly developing country Parties￿. The Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 1997 also asks the parties to ￿Cooperate in the promotion of 
effective modalities for the development, application and diffusion of, and take all practicable steps 
to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally 
sound technologies, know-how, practices and processes pertinent to climate change, in particular 
to developing countries.  
 
The MEA and bilateral environmental negotiations, by this time grown beyond 200 in number, 
depict a wide range of provisions; from very specific and elaborated provisions to rather general 
and ambiguous ones. We find a conflict of interests on some provisions of MEAs between 
developing and developed country parties. In certain agreements, like UNFCCC, developed 
countries are seeking collaboration and considerations from developing countries to address global 
environmental problems which have significantly been caused by environmentally unsustainable   20
practices in the developed countries. This is expected to strengthen the bargaining powers of the 
developing countries and given an opportunity to push through their specific demands related to 
transfer of ESTs.  
 
Another issue of MEAs is that of reciprocity; which makes the implementation of agreed obligations 
by the developing countries conditional upon effective implementation of obligations by the 
developed country parties (e.g.: UNFCCC Article 4.7) 
 
An important dimension of the MEAs in provision of diffusion of ESTs is their endeavour towards 
overcoming the financial constraints to acquire such technologies and access technological know-
how by the developing countries. Financial constraints have been a major problem for the 
developing countries to adopt the state-of-the-art technology in environmental management. The 
Montreal Protocol (Article 10, 10A)￿ along with Kyoto Protocol (Article 10) and UNFCCC (Article 11) 
has been most explicit in this issue of providing financial support in capacity building in developing 




Institutional Mechanisms at the National Level 
Since one accept FDI as a major channel for the transfer of ESTs, proper stimulations should be in 
place which favors the transfer of ESTs. The institutional framework and functioning of that at the 
national level is a crucial issue in the process of dissemination of ESTs. Good and stable 
governance and transparent and predictable regulatory frameworks are primary necessities. 
Ensuring a proper competitive framework for the industry is another component of national level 
efficiency. Next are the issues of absorbing the delivered technology into the industrial framework 
of the host country. Effective use of transferred ESTs requires conducive macroeconomic, in 
particular, fiscal and other incentives based policies. The policy framework should a) encourage 
the full use of the acquired technology, and b) should drive the private sector in developing 
countries to seek partnerships with industry and institutions in the developed countries; to keep up 
with the new research and developments. Certain further issues at the national level of policy 
formulation deserve deeper understanding. The import liberalisations by the government is said to 
have an adverse effect on transfer of technology; because this opens up the economy to the 
possibility of export of the MNEs without establishing production facilities over there. Financial 
mechanisms of the MEAs and effective forms of technical assistance to the developing countries 
must be used in a proper form to compensate that tendency. Secondly, opportunities created by 
various channels of transfer of technology will tend to concentrate in a country according to its   21
ability to develop its own technical capabilities. Therefore, creating an enabling a favourable 
environment for the further development of indigenous technological capabilities is of utmost 
importance in designing policy.  
 
The Global Technology Market and the MNEs 
The third entity in the story of EST transfer is the industry framework within which the MNEs are 
working and the extent of their integration. Environmentally friendly technologies and practices are 
obviously part of the MNCs assets which may benefit developing host countries. MNCs may be a 
vehicle for the diffusion of environmentally friendly management practices and technologies in 
developing countries. Furthermore, FDI may lead to some standardization of technologies used 
across countries and may also promote the diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies 
through the expansion of the market for environmental goods and services. Many of the MNCs are 
at the frontier in research on, and the application of, the pollution preventing technologies; their affiliates 
are expected to play a positive role in diffusing those technologies in developing countries.  
 
  While there is no doubt that MNCs have the potential for introducing environmentally sound 
technologies in host developing countries, their actual environmental impact depends on many 
factors. Most important of them are the sectors in which they invest, the age of their facilities, their 
strategies -i.e., market, resource, efficiency or asset-seeking (see Dunning, 1994a) etc. The degree 
of export orientation of the investment (especially when the destination market is "environmentally-
sensitive") also contributes towards the diffusion of environmental technology to the developing 
country production facilities. Much important also is their corporate environmental policies, and 
approach towards environmental management. These strategies ultimately develop the extent of 
integration in the host country industrial sector and type of their linkages with domestic suppliers, 
clients and competitors. The host country environmental regulations and their degree of 
enforcement and the role played by stakeholder groups such as non-governmental organizations, 
consumers, workers and local communities can have significant say on the development of such 
linkages and technology diffusion. 
 
The market as an institution and the practiced technology norms influence the technology transfer 
and environmental management significantly. A matured environmental management paradigm 
generally asks for integrated pollution management rather than end-of-the-pipe treatments. This 
induces the advanced pollution preventive technology to come through the affiliates of MNCs. They 
may also influence the environmental management of their affiliates’ suppliers, competitors and 
customers both by setting an example and by introducing their own environmental standards.   22
Furthermore, the parent companies may also provide local engineers and technical staff with 
training in pollution prevention technologies and practices and waste minimization.  
 
 However, they are also facing increasing difficulties in this front due to direct and indirect cost 
escalations. The direct cost increases are related to the increases factor payments and 
increasingly technical and capital oriented nature of researches. The indirect costs increase mainly 
due to shorter product life cycles and intensifying competition in the global markets. This is giving 
birth to an international pattern of different kind of (technical or financial) collaboration with respect 
to R&D. this sometimes even incorporates government agencies or academic or other research 
institutions also. But this has been significantly less in cases of developing countries, at least when 
compared to purely commercial collaborations or mergers or acquisitions. However, this process 
has a potentiality to build the indigenous capacity in a developing country, and more attention to 
this point is needed. The MNEs also have been increasingly using IPRs to extend their market 
powers and to compensate the loss due to shorter product life cycles. This has an adverse effect 
on the process of dissemination of technological know-how to the developing countries. 
Institutional mechanisms are required to observe and control this phenomenon to strike a balance 




Trying to show the possibility of a ￿pollution haven￿ effect to be real in the case of India, the paper 
endeavored to find out the mechanism of phasing out such a phenomenon. In the process it 
attempted to bring together the issue of environmental policy with that of technology diffusion in 
order to understand better how industry might react to policy. In fact, to effect a better management 
of the industrial pollution problems, the understanding of the dynamics of the relation between the 
said two becomes much more important. In our analysis, the interaction between them became 
crucial and deterministic. A free flow of information encompassing the industry, the linkage firms, 
and the government as well is needed to have a better management. This clearly points out the 
area of interaction between govt. and industry and the international institutional interface. In the 
one hand, the local factor suggests its contribution towards a better management of the case, 
especially where the impact is geographically limited. It ushers for the direct and active 
involvement of the local authority, and also asks for the possible involvement of the public interest 
groups like citizen forums to measure up the challenge more effectively. On the other hand, the 
efficient designed of the liability norms may induce the industry to adopt the abatement technology 
rather than any other alternative action. With this theoretical understanding, the paper endeavors 
to understand the institutional mechanism at the international and national level and tries to find the   23
scope of their intervention to effectively guide the process of environmental technology diffusion 
through the MNEs in a developing country. The dynamics of such diffusion is multiplex and 
requires a comprehensive understanding to control and encourage the process.  
 
At the bottom, we would say that the analysis presented over here is only exploratory in nature and 
thus should be considered as being suggestive rather than conclusive. But such a framework might 
help carry out empirical research to provide with quantitative insights about the case and thus 
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Notes 
1. The Body of Environmental legislations in India 
•   Wildlife Protection Act, 1972 
•   Forest Conservation Act, 1980 
•   Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 
•   Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977 
•   Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 
•   The Environment (Protection) Act, 1981 
•   The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 
•   The Environmental Impact Assessment Notification, 1994 
 
2. MoEF, GoI ￿ the Environmental Impact Assessment Notification, Schedule A, 1994 
 
3. The selected industries are: Aluminum, Caustic, Cement, Copper, Distillery, DYES & D.I., Fertilizer, Iron & Steel, 
Leather, Pesticide, Petro-Chemical, Pharmaceuticals, Pulp & Paper, Refinery, Sugar, TPP, Zinc.  
 
4. The main MEAs in the context are: 
•  The Basel Convention  On Transboundary Movements Of Hazardous Wastes And Their Disposal 
•  Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete The Ozone Layer 
•  The Un Convention On Biological Diversity 
•  The Un Framework Convention On Climate Change 
•  Rotterdam (Pic) Convention 
•  Stockholm (Pops) Convention 








•  Table 1:  Sector-wise Breakup of FDI and technical Collaboration Approved  (01.08.1991 to 31.03.2002); SIA 
Newsletter April 2002; Secretariat for Industrial Assistance, Department of Industrial Policy, GoI 
 
•  Table 2:  Flow of FDI to India, Ministry Of Commerce, GoI 
 
•  Figure 1 is inferred from Table 27:  Production of Selected Industries; Handbook of Statistics on Indian 
Economy, Reserve Bank of India, 2000 (pp 44-45). 
 
•  Figure 2 is inferred from Table 116:  Exports of Principal (pp 163-166) and from Table 118: Imports of Principal 
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